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Abstract
A type ﬂaw attack on a security protocol is an attack where an honest principal is cheated on interpreting
a ﬁeld in a message as the one with a type other than the intended one. In this paper, we shall present an
extension of the LySa calculus with tags attached to each ﬁeld, indicating the intended types. We developed
a control ﬂow analysis for analysing the extended LySa, which over-approximates all the possible behaviour
of a protocol and hence is able to capture any type confusion that may happen during the protocol execution.
The control ﬂow analysis has been applied to a number of security protocols, either subject to type ﬂaw
attacks or not. The results show that it is able to capture type ﬂaw attacks on those security protocols.
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1 Introduction
A type ﬂaw attack on a security protocol arises when a ﬁeld, originally intended
to have one type, is instead interpreted as having another type. To prevent such
attacks, the current techniques [11,12] consist in systematically associating each
message ﬁeld with a tag representing its intended type. Therefore ﬁelds with dif-
ferent types cannot be mixed up. Nevertheless, these may result in requiring extra
and somehow unnecessary computational power and network transmission band.
This is particularly heavy, when resources are limited such as in battery-powered
embedded systems like PDAs, cell phones, laptops, etc.
In this paper, we explore these issues and propose a static analysis technique,
based on Control Flow Analysis, for detecting potential type ﬂaw attacks in the
1 This work has been partially supported by the project SENSORIA.
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presence of a Dolev-Yao attacker [7]. The proposed approach abstracts the ﬁelds of
protocol messages to a lower level, such that the misinterpretation can be formally
modelled. To this end, we extend the LySa calculus [2,3] with special tags, which
represent the type of terms. The Control Flow Analysis approximates the behaviour
of protocols in terms of the possibly exchanged messages and potential values of
variables. The analysis can be working in either a prescriptive way, such that
type ﬂaws are avoided; or a descriptive way, such that type ﬂaws are detected and
recorded as violations of the intended types. Furthermore, if no type violation is
found, we can prove that the protocol is free of type ﬂaw attacks at run time. The
analysis is fully automated and always terminates. It has been successfully applied
to a number of protocols, such as Woo-Lam π1[19] and Andrew Secure RPC [17].
LYSA has been given diﬀerent kinds of annotations for checking other security
properties, e.g. conﬁdentiality [9] and freshness [8]. It is very easy to combine
tags with those techniques, thus giving a more comprehensive results of analysing
security protocols.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we present the LySa calculus
with tags for type ﬂaw attacks, both the syntax and semantics are deﬁned. We intro-
duce the Control Flow Analysis in Section 3, which captures any type-mismatching
that may happen. In Section 4, we show how the Control Flow Analysis works
on two example protocols that are subject to type ﬂaw attacks. In Section 5, we
conclude with an assessment of our approach and a comparison with related work.
2 Calculus
The LySa calculus [2,3] is a process algebra, in the tradition of the π- [14] and
Spi- [1] calculi. It diﬀers from these essentially in two aspects. The ﬁrst is the
absence of channels: all processes have only access to a single global communication
channel, the ether. The second aspect concerns the inclusion of pattern matching
into the language constructs where values can become bound to values, i.e. into input
and into decryption. This is diﬀerent from having a separate matching construct,
usually an if-then construct as in other process calculi and lead to more succinct
speciﬁcations of protocols. We use here a dialect of LySa, which presents a more
general pattern matching than the one in [2,3]. See also [5,16] for an alternative
treatment.
Syntax of Terms
The basic blocks of LySa are values, used to represent agent names, nonces,
keys. Syntactically, they are described by terms that may either be standard terms
E or matching terms M . Standard terms – that can be names or variables – are
used for modelling outputs and encryptions. Instead, for modelling inputs and de-
cryptions we use matching terms, that, in turn, can be standard terms, or variables.
We distinguish between deﬁnition (or binding) occurrences and use (or applied) oc-
currences of variables. A deﬁnition occurrence is when a variable gets its binding
value, while a use occurrence is an appearance of a variable where its binding value
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is used.
The distinction is obtained by means of syntax: the deﬁnition occurrence of
a variable x is denoted by x, while in the scope of the declaration, the variable
appears as x. Furthermore, this notation distinguishes variables from occurrences
of standard terms in tuples of matching terms, by implicitly partitioning them into
standard terms or variables. In pattern matching, the ﬁrst are checked for matching,
while the others are bound in case of successful matching (see below).
S ::= standard terms
n name (n ∈ N )
x use variable (x ∈ XS)
S ::= matching standard terms
S standard terms
x deﬁnition variable (x ∈ XS)
Here N , XS, denote sets of names and of applied occurrences of variables, respec-
tively. The name n is used to represent keys, nonces and names of principals.
Type Tagging We extend the syntax of standard LySa to cope with types, by
using tags to represent the types of terms. Following [11], we assume to have a tag
for each base type, such as nonce, key, etc. Moreover, we assume that the attacker
is able to change only the types of terms that he can access. In fact, by making
the assumption of perfect cryptography, we have that only cleartext can be altered.
Attackers can only forge an encryption when possessing the key used to cipher it.
Actually, we can tag whatever we want, but we only check inside encryptions and
decryptions, as shall be shown in Section 3.
Tag  Tag ::= agent | nonce | key | . . .
There are type variables, that are to standard variables such as tags are to closed
terms (i.e. terms without variables). Similarly to the -notation, we syntactically
distinguish the deﬁning occurrences of type variables (in the form t), from the
corresponding use occurrences (in the form t). Syntactically, we have the following
two new categories, where XT denote sets of applied occurrences of type variables.
T ::= type terms
Tag type tags (Tag ∈ Tag)
t use type variable (t ∈ XT )
T ::= matching type terms
T type terms
t deﬁning type variable (t ∈ XT )
Furthermore, we can merge the above syntactic categories with the ones for standard
terms in order to obtain the two more general syntactic categories for terms E and
matching terms M . Encryptions are tuples of terms E1, · · · , Ek encrypted under a




{E1, · · · , Ek}E0 symmetric encryption
M ::= matching terms
S matching standard terms
T matching type terms
{M1, . . . ,Mk}E matching encryption
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We call V al the set of values, i.e. closed terms. Each value can have a type tag
associated with it. From here on, for readability, we usually associate standard
terms and type terms in encryptions and decryptions.
Syntax of Processes
In addition to the classical constructs for composing processes, our calculus also
contains both an input construct with matching and a decryption operation with
matching. Furthermore, to keep track of the decryptions in which a violation occurs,
we decorate each decryption with a label l (from a numerable set C). Labels are
mechanically attached to program points in which decryptions occur (they are nodes
in the abstract syntax tree of processes). Finally, by overloading the symbol ν, we
use a new process construct to declare the expected type of a type variable.
P ::= processes
〈E1, . . . , Ek〉.P output
(M1, . . . ,Mk).P input
decrypt E as {M1, . . . ,Mk}
l
E0
in P decryption with matching
(ν n)P restriction
(ν t : Tag)P type declaration
P1 | P2 parallel composition
!P replication
0 nil
The sets of free variables, resp. free names, and of bound variables and names, of a
term or a process are written fv(·), fn(·), bv(·), bn(·), respectively. They are deﬁned
in the standard way. As usual, we omit the trailing 0 of processes.
Our patterns – in the form (M1, · · · ,Mk) – are matched against tuples of terms
(E1, · · · , Ek). Note that, at run time, each (E1, · · · , Ek) only includes closed terms,
i.e. each variable composing each one of the Ei has been bound in the previous
computations. Instead, matching terms Mi can be partitioned in closed terms and
variables to be bound. Intuitively, the matching succeeds when the closed terms,
say Mi, pairwise match to the corresponding terms Ei, and its eﬀect is to bind
the remaining terms Ej to the remaining variables xj . To exemplify, consider the
following two processes, where only standard terms are present.
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The decryption in P succeeds only if wn = NB: in this case xa will be bound to
A. Instead, the second decryption in Q always succeeds, and results in binding xa
to A, and yn to NB .
The roles played by tags and type variables in the pattern matching are the
same played by terms and variables. Suppose, e.g. to have the following processes:
R = (νtk : key)decrypt {(A, agent), (NB , nonce), (z, key)}K as




R˜ = (νtk : key)decrypt {(A, agent), (NB , nonce), (z, nonce)}K as




S = decrypt {(A, agent), (NB , nonce), (z, t)}K as




The decryptions in R and R˜ always succeed and result in binding zk to (the values
assumed by) z, and tk to key or to nonce. In particular, in R˜ the decryption
succeeds, even though the declared type for tk is key. In the decryption in S only
if t successfully matches with key then zk is bound to z.
Operational Semantics
Below we slightly modify the standard structural congruence ≡ on LySa pro-
cesses, also to take care of type declarations. It is the least congruence satisfying
the following clauses:
• P ≡ Q if P and Q are disciplined α-equivalent (as explained below);
• (P/≡, |, 0) is a commutative monoid;
• (νn)0 ≡ 0, (νn)(νn′)P ≡ (νn′)(νn)P , (νn)(P | Q) ≡ P | (νn)Q if n ∈ fn(P ),
(νt : Tag)0 ≡ 0, (νt : Tag)(νt′ : Tag)P ≡ (νt′ : Tag)(νt : Tag)P ,
(νt : Tag)(P | Q) ≡ P | (νt : Tag)Q if t ∈ bv(P );
• !P ≡ P | !P
To simplify the deﬁnition of our control ﬂow analysis in Section 3, we disci-
pline the α-renaming of bound values and variables. To do it in a simple and
“implicit” way, we partition all the names used by a process into ﬁnitely many
equivalence classes and we use the names of the equivalence classes instead of the
actual names. This partition works in a way that names from the same equiva-
lence class are assigned a common canonical name and consequently there are only
ﬁnitely many canonical names in any execution of a given process. This is enforced
by assigning the same canonical name to every name generated by the same re-
striction. The canonical name n	 is for a name n; similarly x	 is for a variable
x. For example, a process, that may generate inﬁnitely many names, is !(ν n)P ,
as shown in the following chain of equivalences: !(ν n)P ≡ (ν n′)P ′ | !(ν n)P ≡
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(ν n′)P ′ | (ν n′′)P ′′ | !(ν n)P ≡ . . . Furthermore, the names n, n′ and n′′ are
generated by the same restriction and hence have the same canonical name, i.e.
n	 = n′	 = n′′	. In this way, we statically maintain the identity of values and
variables that may be lost by freely applying α−conversions. Hereafter, when un-
ambiguous, we shall simply write n (resp. x) for n	 (resp. x	).
Following the tradition of the π-calculus, we shall give LySa a reduction se-
mantics. The reduction relation →R is the least relation on closed processes that
satisﬁes the rules in Table 1. It uses structural congruence, as deﬁned above, and
the disciplined treatment of α-conversion. We consider two variants of reduction
relation →R, graphically identiﬁed by a diﬀerent instantiation of the relation R,
which decorates the transition relation. Both semantics use the type environment
Γ, which maps a type variable in a set of tags.
Γ : XT → ℘(Tag)
One variant (→RM) takes advantage of checks on type associations, while the other
one (→) discards them: essentially, the ﬁrst semantics checks for type matching,
while the other one does not (see below):




false if M = t ∧E ∈ Γ(t)
true otherwise
This function aﬀects only type variables, i.e. only matching terms M in the form
t. It checks whether the type (Γ(t)) associated with the variable includes E.
• the standard semantics Γ  P → Q takes, by construction, R to be universally
true (and therefore the index R is omitted).
Moreover, we deﬁne two auxiliary functions that handle the diﬀerence between
closed terms and variables to be bound, by implicitly partitioning the tuples and
treating the respective elements diﬀerently. We use a slightly modiﬁed notion of
substitution applied to a process P , P [E/M ], where M can be either x or t.
P [E/M ] =
⎧⎨
⎩
P [M → E] if M ∈ {x| x ∈ XS} ∪ {t| t ∈ XT }
P otherwise
The pattern matching function comp(E,M) compares E against M only when M




false if E = M ∧ (fv(M) ∪ bv(M) = ∅)
true otherwise
The judgement Γ  P →R P
′ means that the process P can evolve into P ′, given
the type environment Γ.
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(Com)
∧ki=1comp(Ei,Mi)





Γ  decrypt {E1, . . . , Ek}E0 as {M1, . . . ,Mk}
l
E0
in P →R P [E1/M1, . . . , Ek/Mk]
(Type Decl) (Res)
Γ[t 	→ Tag]  P →R P
′
Γ  (ν t : Tag)P →R (ν t : Tag)P ′
Γ  P →R P
′
Γ  (ν n)P →R (ν n)P ′
(Par) (Congr)
Γ  P1 →R P
′
1




P ≡ P ′ ∧ Γ  P ′ →R P
′′ ∧ P ′′ ≡ P ′′′
Γ  P →R P ′′′
Table 1
Operational semantics, Γ  P →R P
′, parameterised on R.
The rule (Com) expresses that an output 〈E1, . . . , Ek〉.P is matched by an input
(M1, . . . ,Mk) by checking whether the closed terms Mi are pairwise the same with
the corresponding Ei (i.e. if comp(Ei,Mi)). When the matchings are successful,
the remaining Ej are bound to the corresponding Mj (that are variables or type
variables).
Similarly, the rule (Decr) expresses the result of matching an encryption




in P . As it was the case for com-
munication, the closed terms Mi must match with the corresponding Ei, and ad-
ditionally the keys must be the same. When the matching is successful the re-
maining terms Ej are bound to the corresponding Mi (that are deﬁnition vari-
ables or deﬁnition type variables). Recall that in the reference monitor seman-
tics we ensure that the components of the decrypted message have the types ex-
pected, by checking whether the t are bound to a type tag that is included in
Γ(t). In the standard semantics the condition R(E,M) is universally true and
thus can be ignored. Back to our example processes R, R˜, S, we have that in R,
comp(z, zk) = comp(key, t) = true and RM(key, t) = true (because key ∈ Γ(t)),
while in R˜, comp(z, zk) = comp(nonce, t) = true, but RM(nonce, t) = false
(because nonce ∈ Γ(t)). Note also that in S, comp(t, key) = true only if t = key,
and, in this case P [z/zk] = P [zk → z].
The rule (Type Decl) records the new association between the type variable t
and the type Tag in the type environment Γ. The updating of Γ is indicated as
Γ[t → Tag].
The rules (Repl), (Par) and (Congr) are standard.
Dynamic Property
As for the dynamic property of the process, we shall consider a process free
of type ﬂaw attack, when in all computations, each type variable is bound to the
expected type. Consequently, the reference monitor will never stop any execution
step. Note that we only consider the type ﬂaws occurring inside encryptions and
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decrytpions.
Deﬁnition 2.1 A process P is free of type ﬂaw attacks when for each step Γ 
P →∗ P ′ → P ′′, we always have Γ  P →∗ P ′ →RM P
′′.
3 Static Analysis
We develop a control ﬂow analysis for analysing tagged LYSA processes. The aim
of the analysis is to safely over-approximate all the possible protocol behaviour
which permits to safely approximate when the reference monitor may abort the
computation of a process P . The approximation is represented by a tuple (Γ, ρ, κ, ψ)
(resp. a pair (ρ, ϑ) when analysing a term E), called estimate for P (resp. for E), that
satisﬁes the judgements deﬁned by the axioms and rules of Table 2. In particular,
the analysis records which value tuples may ﬂow over the network and which values
may be bound to each deﬁnition variable (e.g. x) and deﬁnition type variable (e.g.
t). Moreover, at each decryption place, the analysis checks whether a type tag
(e.g. Tag) bound to each deﬁnition type variable is the intended one, or a violation
is reported. The analysis is deﬁned in the ﬂavor of Flow Logic [15].
Analysis of Terms
The judgement for analysing terms is ρ |= E : ϑ. The analysis keeps track of the
potential values of variables or type variables, e.g. x or t, by recording them into
the global abstract environment ρ:
• ρ : XS ∪XT → ℘(V al) maps variables and type variable to the sets of values that
they may be bound to.
The judgement is deﬁned by the axioms and rules in the upper part of Table 2.
Basically, the rules amount to demanding that ϑ contains all the values associated
with the components of a term, e.g. a name n evaluates to the set ϑ, provided that
n belongs to ϑ; similarly for a variable x, provided that ϑ includes the set of values
ρ(x) to which x is associated with.
Analysis of Processes
In the analysis of processes, the information on the possible values, that may
ﬂow over the network, is collected into the component κ:
• κ ⊆ ℘(V al∗): the abstract network environment that includes all the value-tuples
forming a message that may ﬂow on the network.
The judgement for processes takes the form: ρ, κ,Γ |= P : ψ, where the com-
ponents ρ, κ, and Γ are as above (recall that Γ : XT → ℘(Tag)), while ψ ⊆ C,
is the (possibly empty) set of “error messages” of the form l, indicating that a
type-mismatching (or violation) may happen at the decryption, labelled l. The
judgement is deﬁned by the axioms and rules in the lower part of Table 2 (where
X ⇒ Y means that Y is only evaluated when X is True) and are explained later.
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For keeping the analysis component ﬁnite, as said before, we have partitioned
all the names used by a process into ﬁnitely many equivalence classes and we have
used the names of the equivalence classes instead of the actual names.
Before commenting on the analysis rules, we introduce three auxiliary functions,
all of which generate some logic formulas to be used in the analysis rules. See some
examples below.
The ﬁrst one is the matching function, which takes care of pattern matching
a value v to a matching term M . Remember that pattern matching cannot be
performed on either x or t, requiring that M has to be some S or T . If this is the




false if M ∈ {S, T} ∧ v ∈ ϑ where ϑ is s.t. (ρ |= M : ϑ)
true otherwise
The second one is a substitution function, which corresponds to the notion of variable
binding. Intuitively, it only makes sense to bind a value to either a deﬁnition variable
or a deﬁnition type variable. So the substitution function binds the value v to M




false if v ∈ ρ(M) with M ∈ {x| x ∈ XS} ∪ {t| t ∈ XT }
true otherwise
The last function is about type checking. Given a type environment Γ, it checks
whether v is the expected type of a deﬁnition type variable t. If it is not the case,
the decryption labeled l, is recorded in the error component ψ. Note that in order
to let the type checking work, M has to be a deﬁnition type.
chk(v,M,Γ, l, ψ) =
⎧⎨
⎩
false ifM ∈ {t| t ∈ XT } ∧ v = Γ(t) ∧ l ∈ ψ
true otherwise
match(n,m, ρ) = (ρ |= n : ϑ ∧ m ∈ ϑ) match(m, x) = true
sub(m, x) = (m ∈ ρ(x)) sub(m,n) = true
chk(m, t,Γ, l, ψ) = (m = Γ(t) ⇒ l ∈ ψ) chk(m,n,Γ, l) = true
We now brieﬂy comment on the rules for analysing processes. In the premises
of the rule for k-ary output (Out), we require that all the terms are abstractly
evaluated, and that all the combinations of these values are recorded in κ, since
they are the values that may be communicated. Finally, the continuation process
must be analysed.
The rule (In) describes the analysis of pattern matching input and uses both
the match function and substitution. The idea is to examine all the sequences of
〈v1, ..., vk〉 in the κ component and to point-wise compare it against the tuple of
matching terms (M1, ...,Mk). The matching function selects only the closed terms
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(Const)
N ∈ ϑ
ρ |= N : ϑ
(N = Tag or n) (V ar)
ρ(X) ⊆ ϑ
ρ |= X : ϑ
(X = x or t)
(Encr)
∧ki=0 ρ |= Ei : ϑi ∧
∀v0, . . . , vk : ∧
k
i=0 vi ∈ ϑi ⇒ {v1, . . . , vk}v0 ∈ ϑ
ρ |= {E1, . . . , Ek}E0 : ϑ
(Out)
∧ki=1 ρ |= Ei : ϑi ∧
∀v1, . . . , vk : ∧
k
i=1vi ∈ ϑi ⇒ 〈v1, . . . , vk〉 ∈ κ ∧
ρ, κ,Γ |= P : ψ
ρ, κ,Γ |= 〈E1, . . . , Ek〉.P : ψ
(In)
∀〈v1, . . . , vk〉 ∈ κ ∧
k
i=1 (match(vi,Mi) ⇒ sub(vi,Mi)) ∧
ρ, κ,Γ |= P : ψ
ρ, κ,Γ |= (M1, . . . ,Mk).P : ψ
(Dec)
ρ |= E : ϑ ∧ ρ |= E0 : ϑ0 ∧
∀{v1, . . . , vk}v0 ∈ ϑ : v0 ∈ ϑ0 ⇒
∧ki=1(match(vi,Mi) ⇒ (sub(vi,Mi) ∧ chk(vi,Mi,Γ, l))) ∧
ρ, κ,Γ |= P : ψ
ρ, κ,Γ |= decrypt E as {M1, . . . ,Mk}
l
E0
in P : ψ
(TNew)
(t, Tag) ∈ Γ ∧ ρ, κ,Γ |= P : ψ
ρ, κ,Γ |= (ν t : Tag)P : ψ
(Par)
ρ, κ,Γ |= P1 : ψ ∧ ρ, κ,Γ |= P2 : ψ
ρ, κ,Γ |= P1 | P2 : ψ
(Res)
ρ, κ,Γ |= P : ψ
ρ, κ,Γ |= (ν n)P : ψ
(Rep)
ρ, κ,Γ |= P : ψ
ρ, κ,Γ |=!P : ψ
(Nil) ρ, κ,Γ |= 0 : ψ
Table 2
Analysis of tagged Lysa Terms: ρ |= E : ϑ, and Processes: ρ, κ,Γ |= P : ψ
and for each of them, say Mi, checks whether the corresponding vi is included in
ϑi, i.e. the result of the analysis for Mi. If the matching succeeds for all the closed
terms, then, the substitution function takes care of binding the remaining values vj
to the corresponding deﬁnition variables or deﬁnition type variables Mj . Moreover,
the continuation process must be analysed.
The rule for decryption (Dec) is quite similar to the rule for input : matching
and substitution are handled in the same way. The values to be matched are those
obtained by evaluating the term E and the matching ones are the terms inside the
decryption. If the matching succeeds for all closed terms, then the substitution is
applied to the remaining values that are bound to the corresponding deﬁnition vari-
ables or deﬁnition type variables. When processing the substitution, type checking
is also performed to capture violations. These occur when a deﬁnition type vari-
able is bound to an unexpected type. In this case, the label l of the decryption is
recorded in the error component ψ. Both in the case of input and decryption we
make sure only to analyse the continuation process P in those cases where the input
or decryption could indeed succeed.
The rule for type declaration (TNew) requires that the declared type is recorded
in the type environment Γ.
The rule for the inactive process (Nil) does not restrict the analysis result, while
the rules for parallel composition (Par), restriction (Res), and replication (Rep)
ensure that the analysis also holds for the immediate subprocesses.
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Semantic properties
Our analysis is semantically correct regardless of the way the semantics of LySa
is parameterised. More precisely, we proved a subject reduction theorem for both
the standard and the reference monitor semantics: if (ρ, κ,Γ) |= P : ψ, then the
same tuple (ρ, κ, ψ,Γ) is a valid estimate for all the states passed through in a
computation of P , i.e. for all the derivatives of P .
Lemma 3.1 (Substitution for Terms) ρ |= E : ϑ and E′ ∈ ρ(x) imply ρ |=
E[E′/x] : ϑ
Proof. The proof proceeds by structural induction over term by regarding each of
the rules in the analysis.
Case (Const). Assume that E = N and ρ |= N : ϑ. For arbitrary choices
of x and E′ it holds that N [E′/x] = N so it is immediate that also ρ |= N [E′/x] : ϑ.
Case (Var). Assume that E = X and ρ |= X : ϑ, i.e. that ρ(X) ⊆ ϑ.
Then there are two cases. Either X = x in which case X[E′/x] = X so clearly
ρ |= X[V/x] : ϑ. Alternatively, X = x in which case X[E′/x] = E′. Furthermore
assume that E′ ∈ ρ(x) and because ρ(x) ⊆ ϑ, it holds that ρ |= E′ : ϑ in which case
ρ |= X[E′/x] : ϑ by the analysis.
Case (Encr). Follow directly from the induction hypothesis 
Lemma 3.2 (Substitution for Processes) ρ, κ,Γ |= P : ψ and E ∈ ρ(x) imply
ρ, κ,Γ |= P [E/x] : ψ
Proof. The proof is done by straightforward induction applying the induction hy-
pothesis on any sub-process and lemma 3.1 on any sub-terms. 
Lemma 3.3 (Predicates Equivalence 1) For any arbitrary v and M ,
match(v,M) ⇒ (v,M)
Lemma 3.4 (Predicates Equivalence 2) For any arbitrary v,M ,Γ and l,
chk(v,M) ⇒R(v,M)
Lemma 3.5 (Invariance of Structural Congruence) If P ≡ Q and ρ, κ,Γ |=
P : ψ then ρ, κ,Γ |= Q : ψ
Proof. The proof amounts to a straightforward inspection of each of the clauses
deﬁning P ≡ Q.

Theorem 3.6 (Subject reduction) If Γ  P → Q and ρ, κ,Γ |= P : ψ then also
ρ, κ,Γ |= Q : ψ. Furthermore, if ψ = ∅ then P →RM Q
Proof. By induction on the inference of P → Q.
In case (Com) we assume
ρ, κ,Γ |= 〈E1, . . . , Ek〉.P | (M1, . . . ,Mk).Q : ψ which amounts to:
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(a) ∧ki=1ρ |= Ei : ϑi
(b) ∀v1, . . . , vk : ∧
k
i=1vi ∈ ϑi ⇒ 〈v1, . . . , vk〉 ∈ κ
(c) ρ, κ,Γ |= P : ψ




i=1sub(vi,Mi) ∧ ρ, κ,Γ |= Q : ψ
Moreover we assume that ∧ki=1comp(Ei,Mi) because
〈E1, . . . , Ek〉.P | (M1, . . . ,Mk).Q → P | Q[E1/M1, . . . , Ek/Mk] and we have to prove
ρ, κ,Γ |= P | Q[E1/M1, . . . , Ek/Mk] : ψ. From (a) we have ∧
k
i=1Ei ∈ ϑi since
∧ki=1fv(Ei) = ∅ and then (b) gives 〈E1, . . . , Ek〉 ∈ κ.
¿From the assumption ∧ki=1comp(Ei = Mi) we get ∧
k
i=1match(Ei,Mi). Now
(d) gives ∧ki=1sub(Ei,Mi) and ρ, κ,Γ |= Q : ψ. The substitution result then gives
ρ, κ,Γ |= Q[E1/M1, . . . , Ek/Mk] and together with (c) this gives the required result.
The second part is trivial: when ψ = ∅, obviously
〈E1, . . . , Ek〉.P | (M1, . . . ,Mk).Q →RM P | Q[E1/M1, . . . , Ek/Mk]
In case (Dec) we assume




in P : ψ
which amounts to:
(f) ∧ki=0 ρ |= Ei : ϑi
(g) ∀v0, . . . , vk : ∧
k
i=0vi ∈ ϑi ⇒ {v1, . . . , vk}v0 ∈ ϑ
(h) ρ |= E′0 : ϑ
′
0
(i) ∀{v1, . . . , vk}v0 ∈ ϑ : v0 ∈ ϑ0
⇒ ∧ki=1match(vi,Mi) ⇒ (∧
k
i=1(sub(vi,Mi)∧
chk(vi,Mi,Γ, l) ∧ ρ, κ,Γ |= P : ψ)
Furthermore we assume that ∧ki=0comp(Ei,Mi) because





P [E1/M1, . . . , Ek/Mk] and we have to prove ρ, κ,Γ |= P [E1/M1, . . . , Ek/Mk] : ψ.
From (f) and ∧ki=0fv(Ei) = ∅, we get ∧
k
i=0Ei ∈ ϑi and then (g) gives
{E1, . . . , Ek}E0 ∈ ϑ. From (h) and the assumption ∧
k
i=0comp(Ei,Mi) we get
v0 ∈ ϑ0 and ∧
k
i=1match(vi,Mi). Now (i) gives ∧
k
i=1(sub(vi,Mi) ∧ chk(vi,Mi,Γ, l)
and ρ, κ,Γ |= P : ψ. Using Lemma 3.2 we get the required result
ρ, κ,Γ |= P [E1/M1, . . . , Ek/Mk]
For the second part of the result we observe that
∧ki=1chk(vi,Mi,Γ, l) follows from (i) and since ψ = ∅ it must be the case that ∧
k
i=1
if Mi ∈ {t|t ∈ XT } then v = Γ(t). Thus the condition of the rule (Dec) are
fulﬁlled for →RM.
In case (Tyep Decl) we assume
ρ, κ,Γ |= (ν t : Tag)P : ψ, which amounts to:
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(a) (t, Tag) ∈ Γ
(b) ρ, κ,Γ |= P : ψ
Furthermore we assume that Γ[t → Tag]  P → Q. By applying the induction
hypothesis on (b), we have ρ, κ,Γ |= Q : ψ, which together with (a) gives the
expected result that ρ, κ,Γ |= (ν t : Tag)Q : ψ.
In cases (Par) and (Rep) follow directly from the induction hypothesis.
The case (Congr) also uses the congruence result.

In addition, when analysing a process P if the error component ψ is empty then
the reference monitor cannot stop the execution of P . This means that our analysis
correctly predicts when we can safely do without the reference monitor.
Theorem 3.7 (Static check for reference monitor) If ρ, κ,Γ |= P : ψ and
ψ = ∅ then RM cannot abort P .
Proof. Suppose per absurdum that such Q and Q′ exist. A straightforward in-
duction extends the subject reduction result to P →∗ Q giving ρ, κ,Γ |= Q : ψ
and ψ = ∅. The part 2 of the subject reduction result applied to Q → Q′ gives
Q →RM Q
′ which is a contradiction. 
Example
Consider a scenario in which a principal A sends out an encrypted nonce onto
the network and another principal B is expecting an encrypted key receiving from
the network. Assume both encryptions use the same key K, obviously, B could be
cheated on accepting the nonce as the key.
A → : {N}K
→ B : {K ′}K
Our control ﬂow analysis can work in two ways depending on how the protocol is
modelled: either detecting what B received is a wrong one or preventing B from
accepting it.
• In case the goal is to detect any type ﬂaw attack may happen to the protocol,
we can model it as follows,
〈A, {(N,nonce)}K 〉.0
| (ν txn : key) (A, xenc). decrypt xenc as {(xn, txn)}
l
K in 0
where the type of the encrypted message that B received, i.e. txn, is declared to
be key. The analysis then gives rise to the analysis components ρ, κ,Γ and ψ with
the following entries:
〈A, {(N,nonce)}K 〉 ∈ κ (txn, key) ∈ Γ l ∈ ψ
{(N,nonce)}K ∈ ρ(xenc) N ∈ ρ(xn) nonce ∈ ρ(txn)
which show that the attack is captured by l ∈ ψ
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• In case one wants to prevent such a type ﬂaw attack from happening, the protocol
can be modelled as,
〈A, {(N,nonce)}K 〉.0
| (A, xenc). decrypt xenc as {(xn, key)}
l
K in 0
It requires that the message inside the encryption that B got has to be a key. In
this case, the analysis result becomes:
〈A, {(N,nonce)}K 〉 ∈ κ Γ = ∅ ψ = ∅
{(N,nonce)}K ∈ ρ(xenc) ρ(xn) = ∅
Now ρ(xn) = ∅ shows that no value binds to the variable xn, i.e. the type ﬂaw
attack is successfully prevented.
Modelling the Attacker
In our work, the protocol and the attacker are formally modelled as two parallel
processes, Psys | P•, where Psys represents the protocol process and P• is some
arbitrary attacker. The attacker considered here is the Dolev-Yao attacker [7],
who is an active attacker and assumed to have the overall control of the network,
over which principals exchange messages. Therefore he has access to messages
transmitted over the network and is able to eavesdrop or replay messages sending
over the network but also to encrypt, decrypt or generate messages provided that
the necessary information is within his knowledge. Instead, secret messages and
keys, e.g. (νKAB), are restricted to their scope in Psys and thus not immediately
accessible to the attacker. To deal with types, we require that the attacker is able
to change types of terms that are accessible to him. We refer to [3] for a description
about modelling the attacker in a similar setup.
4 Validation
To verify the usefulness of our Control Flow Analysis, a number of experiments
have been performed on security protocols from the literature. In this section, we
shall show the analysis results of some example protocols, which are subject to
type ﬂaw attacks, namely the Woo and Lam protocol, version π1 and the Andrew
Secure RPC protocol (both the original version and the BAN version with type ﬂaw
corrected). The analysis results show that those type ﬂaw attacks are successfully
captured. Furthermore, it proves that after BAN’s correction, the Andrew Secure
RPC protocol does not suﬀer from type ﬂaw attacks any longer.
Woo and Lam Protocol π1
Woo and Lam [19] introduced a protocol that ensures one-way authentication
of the initiator of the protocol, A, to a responder, B. The protocol uses symmetric-
key cryptography and a trusted third-party server, S, with whom A and B share
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long-term symmetric keys. The protocol uses a fresh nonce NB produced by B.
The protocol narration is listed in the left part of the ﬁgure below, where KAS and
KBS represent the long-term keys that A and B share with the trusted server S.
1. A → B : A
2. B → A : NB
3. A → B : {A,B,NB}KAS
4. B → S : {A,B, {A,B,NB}KAS}KBS
5. S → B : {A,B,NB}KBS
the protocol narration
1. M(A) → B : A
2. B → M(A) : NB
3. M(A) → B : NB
4. B → M(S) : {A,B,NB}KBS
5. M(S) → B : {A,B,NB}KBS
the type ﬂaw attack
The Woo-Lam protocol is subject to a type ﬂaw attack, which is shown in the
right part of the ﬁgure. The attacker replays the nonce NB to B in step 3, which B
accepts as being of the form {A,B,NB}KAS . B then encrypts whatever he received
and then sends it out in step 4. The attacker intercepts it and replays it to B in
step 5 and therefore fools B to believe that he has authenticated A, whereas A has
not even participated in the run.
In LYSA, the Woo-Lam protocol is modelled as the parallel composition of
three processes, A, B and S, running within the scope of the shared keys, say
PWL = (ν KAS)(ν KBS)(A | B | S). Each process represents the sequence of
actions of one principal as listed below. For clarity, each message begins with the
pair of principals involved in the exchange.
Principal A : (ν txnb : nonce)
/ ∗ 1 ∗ / 〈A,B,A〉.
/ ∗ 2 ∗ / (B,A, (xnb, txnb)).
/ ∗ 3 ∗ / 〈A,B, ({A,B, (xnb, txnb)}KAS , {agent, agent, nonce}key)〉.0
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Principal B : / ∗ 1 ∗ / (A,B,A).
/ ∗ 2 ∗ / (ν NB) 〈B,A, (NB , nonce)〉.
/ ∗ 3 ∗ / (A,B, (yaenc, tyaenc)).
/ ∗ 4 ∗ / 〈B,S, {A,B, (yaenc, tyaenc)}KBS 〉.
/ ∗ 5 ∗ / (S,B, (ysenc, tysenc)).




Server S : (ν tzaenc : enc) (ν tznb : nonce)
/ ∗ 4 ∗ / (B,S, (zyenc, tzyenc)).








/ ∗ 5 ∗ / 〈S,B, {A,B, (znb, tznb)}KBS 〉.0
For the Woo and Lam protocol, we have (ρ, κ,Γ) |= PWL : ψ, where ρ, κ and Γ have
the following non-empty entries (we only list here the interesting ones):
{{A,B, (NB , nonce)}KAS , NB} ⊆ ρ(zaenc) (tzaenc, enc) ∈ Γ
{{agent, agent, nonce}key , nonce} ⊆ ρ(tzaenc) {l2} ∈ ψ
The error component has a non-empty set, ψ = {l2}, showing that a violation may
happen in the decryption marked with label l2 (the second line of step 4 in S). This
is the place where S is trying to decrypt and bind values to the variable zaenc and its
type variable tzaenc, which, as indicated by Γ, can only be {A,B, (NB , nonce)}KAS .
However, ρ(zaenc) and ρ(tzaenc) suggest that zaenc may also have the value NB
and tzaenc may have the value nonce. This violates the type assertion and amounts
to the fact that, in step 4, S receives the message {A,B,NB}KBS instead of the
expected one {A,B, {A,B,NB}KAS}KBS . This exactly corresponds to the type ﬂaw
shown before.
Andrew Secure RPC protocol
The goal of the Andrew Secure RPC protocol is to exchange a fresh, authenti-
cated, secret key between two principals sharing a symmetric key K. In the ﬁrst
message, the initiator A sends a nonce NA, the responder B increments and returns
it as the second message together with his nonce NB . A accepts the value and
returns the NB + 1, B receives and checks the third message and if it contains the
nonce incremented, then he sends a new session key, K ′ to A together with a new
C. Bodei et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 194 (2007) 3–2218
value N ′B to be used in subsequent communications.
1. A → B : A, {NA}K
2. B → A : {NA + 1, NB}K
3. A → B : {NB + 1}K
4. B → A : {K ′, N ′B}K
the protocol narration
1. A → B : A, {NA}K
2. B → A : {NA + 1, NB}K
3. A → M(B) : {NB + 1}K
4. M(B) → A : {NA + 1, NB}K
the type ﬂaw attack
Also, the Andrew Secure RPC protocol [17] is subject to type ﬂaw attack as
shown above in the right part of the ﬁgure: by replaying the message from step 2
to B in step 4, the attacker can successfully force A to accept NA + 1 as the new
session key. The protocol makes use of an operation to increment NA, in step 2,
and NB , in the third step (see [3] for the possible model of SUCC)).
The protocol can be modelled as PAndrew = (ν K)(A | B), where K is the
shared key and A and B are deﬁned as follows ( we only list the relevant steps).
Principal A : (ν NA) (ν txk : key) (ν txnb′ : nonce)
/ ∗ 1 ∗ / 〈A,B,A, {(NA, nonce)}K〉. . . .
/ ∗ 4 ∗ / (B,A, xenc).
decrypt xenc as {(xk, txk), (xnb′ , txnb′)}
lx1
K in 0
Principal B : (ν NB)(ν N
′
B)(ν K
′)(ν tyna : nonce)
/ ∗ 1 ∗ / (A,B,A, yenc).
decrypt yenc as {(yna, tyna)}
ly1
K in
/ ∗ 2 ∗ / 〈B,A, {(yna + 1, tyna), (NB , nonce)}K〉. . . .
For the Andrew Secure RPC protocol, we have (ρ, κ,Γ) |= PAndrew : ψ, where ρ, κ
and Γ have the following non-empty entries (we only list here the interesting ones):
〈B,A, {(NA + 1, nonce), (NB , nonce)}K〉 ∈ κ
{K ′, Na + 1} ⊆ ρ(xk) {key, nonce} ⊆ ρ(txk)
(txk, key) ∈ Γ (lx1) ∈ ψ
The component κ collects all the messages potentially ﬂowing over the network, in-
cluding the one sent by B in step 2, namely 〈B,A, {(NA+1, nonce), (NB , nonce)}K〉.
This message could be received by A in his fourth step (e.g. replayed by an attacker)
and consequently binding NA + 1 to xk and nonce to txk, which can be veriﬁed
by examining the content of ρ (i.e. NA + 1 ∈ ρ(xk) and nonce ∈ ρ(txk)). How-
ever, as suggested by Γ, the expected type of the type variable txk can only be key
(by Γ(txk) = {key}) but not nonce. This violation is captured by the analysis by
recording the label lx1 in the error component ψ (by lx1 ∈ ψ).
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Andrew Secure RPC protocol with type ﬂaw corrected
An improved version of Andrew Secure RPC protocol is suggested in [6] in order
to prevent the above mentioned type ﬂaw attack. The ﬁxing amounts to inserting
another component NA into the encryption in the fourth message, as shown below,
4′. B → A : {K ′, N ′B , NA}K
Now the encryption in step 2 has two ﬁelds and in step 4′, A is expecting an
encryption of 3 ﬁelds, therefore the attacker is no longer able to replay the message
from step 2 and consequently make A accept nonce as a fresh key. This claim is
veriﬁed by applying our analysis, which gives an empty error component, i.e. ψ = ∅.
5 Conclusion and Related Work
A type ﬂaw attack happens when a ﬁeld in a message is interpreted as having a type
other than the originally intended one. In this paper, we extended the syntax of
the process calculus, LYSA, with tags, which represent the intended types of terms.
The semantics of the tagged LYSA makes use of a reference monitor to capture
type-mismatching at run time.
On the static side, we developed a control ﬂow analysis for the tagged LYSA pro-
cesses to check at each decryption place that whether the received, secret data has
the right type. The static analysis ensures that, if each component of an encryption
received by a principal is of the intended type, then the process is not subject to
a type ﬂaw attack at execution time. Actually, for malleability reasons, we only
consider type ﬂaws attacks occurring inside encryptions and decryptions. As far as
the attacker is concerned, we adopted the notion from Dolev-Yao threat model and
extended it with tags in order to ﬁt it into our setting. The control ﬂow analysis
has been applied to a number of protocols, e.g. Woo-Lam π1 and Andrew Secure
RPC as shown in Section 4, and has conﬁrmed that we can successfully detect type
ﬂaw attacks on the protocols.
Type ﬂaw attacks on security protocols have been studied for some years, e.g. [11]
also adopted the technique of tagging each message ﬁeld with intended type, and
later on, [12] simpliﬁed the tag structure for encryption. However these works
aim at preventing type ﬂaw attacks in the protocol execution stage by attaching
some extra bits, representing types, to the messages transmitted over the network,
and consequently the size of each message is increased, which results in raising
unnecessary burden to the underlying network. Other works on type ﬂaw attacks
include applying type and eﬀect system to security protocols, e.g. [10], such that a
protocol is free of type ﬂaw attacks if it is type checked. Type Systems are normally
prescriptive(i.e. they infer types and impose the well-formedness conditions at the
same time), while Control Flow Analysis is normally descriptive (i.e. it merely infers
the information and then leave it to a separate step to actually impose demands on
when programs are well-formed). Our approach oﬀers a mix of both ways. Indeed,
it can be either descriptive, i.e. it describes when the protocol does not respect the
typing (via binding of type variables) or prescriptive, i.e. some ﬂaws are avoided
(via matching of tag terms). Under this regard, launching the tool implementing
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our analysis can then correspond to a sort of approximate type checking. More
speciﬁcally, our control ﬂow analysis can be used to 1) detect type ﬂaw attacks:
it can be applied in the protocol design stage: once a tagged protocol process is
analyzed to be free of type ﬂaw attacks, it can be used untagged while still ensures
security; or 2) prevent type ﬂaw attacks: the tags work in a way such that ﬁelds
with diﬀerent types cannot be mixed up. Therefore, it oﬀers ﬂexibility in satisfying
diﬀerent needs.
LYSA has been developed to be decorated by several kinds of annotations and
successfully applied for checking diﬀerent security properties, e.g. conﬁdentiality [9]
and freshness [8]. It is very easy to combine tags with those techniques, thus ob-
taining a more general form of analysis. The core analysis can remain the same:
diﬀerent inspections of a solution permit to check diﬀerent security properties of a
protocol, with no need of re-analysing it several times.
The control ﬂow analysis presented here is designed to capture simple type ﬂaw
attacks, i.e. one ﬁeld is confused with another single ﬁeld. Future work will extends
the analysis to deal with more complex ones [18], as considered in [13], e.g. when
a single ﬁeld in a message is confused with a concatenation of ﬁelds. Furthermore,
we can think about more complex kinds of tags.
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